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Available online 3 April 2016Due to the experience of large external imbalances and misaligned real exchange rates within the euro area, the
concept of ﬁscal devaluation has gained increasing attention, whichmimics the effects of external devaluation in
the absence of ﬂexible nominal exchange rates and an independent monetary policy. This paper uses a small
open economymodel with nominal wage and price rigidities to analyse the welfare effects of ﬁscal devaluation,
understood as budgetary-neutral tax shift from employers' social security contributions towards consumption
tax. The paper ﬁnds that ﬁscal devaluation can support external rebalancing by accelerating real exchange rate
adjustments and regaining price competitiveness. From a household welfare perspective, internal devaluation
with its concomitant worsening of the terms of trade tends to induce welfare losses. The overall welfare effects
are pro-cyclical in the sense that the stronger the tax shift, the higher the welfare losses for the average house-
hold. The losses increase with the openness of the economy and the relative size of the tradable sector. In the
presence of supply shocks, however, ﬁscal devaluation can imply small welfare gains. A scenario with ﬂexible
nominal exchange rates and autonomous monetary policy performs better in terms of household welfare, but
implies stronger external ﬂuctuations in the short run.
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The experience of large external imbalances has made clear that
prices and real exchange rates can diverge signiﬁcantly between mem-
ber countries of the euro area (EA), in particular without the possibility
of nominal exchange rate adjustments. Althoughwe have seen external
adjustments in recent years, much of the trade balance improvements
in some EA periphery countries have been driven by domestic demand
contraction and cyclical factors rather than regaining price competitive-
ness (Tressel andWang, 2014). To make the external adjustment more
sustainable, it is important to support the export performance by im-
proving price competitiveness.
Against this background, it is of particular interest to analyse policy
tools that support real exchange rate adjustment in the presence of
price and wage rigidities in order to regain price competitiveness. As
an alternative to nominal exchange rate (external) devaluation, the
concept of ﬁscal (internal) devaluation has gained increasing attention,
which mimics the effects of an external devaluation in the absence of
ﬂexible nominal exchange rates and an independent monetary policy.
The idea of ﬁscal devaluation is that a budgetary-neutral tax shift fromauthors only and should not be
's ofﬁcial position.
S. Hohberger),
. This is an open access article underlabour to consumption, or more precisely, from employers' social secu-
rity contributions (SSC) towards consumption tax (VAT) supports real
exchange rate adjustment, improves price competitiveness, and
reduces trade imbalances.
The effect of an internal devaluation on the economy is twofold: One
the one hand, a reduction in employers' SSC lowers ﬁrms' labour costs,
reduces producer prices and increases foreign demand for exports. On
the other hand, higher consumption taxes increase the prices on
imported goods while partly offsetting the fall in domestic producer
prices. Both effects support real exchange rate adjustment and lead to
an improvement of the trade balance. In the long run, however, labour
unions could push through higher wages in order to compensate for
higher consumption expenditures (De Mooij and Keen, 2013). Koske
(2013) provides a comprehensive survey on the economic effects of
ﬁscal devaluation and the transmission mechanisms behind it.
This paper analyses a revenue-neutral tax shift from employers'
SSC towards consumption tax in order to accelerate real exchange
rate adjustment, regain price competitiveness and support external
rebalancing. The main focus is hereby on examining the welfare im-
plications of such internal devaluation in the context of a utility-
based assessment of household welfare.
The literature on ﬁscal devaluationmainly focuses on implementing
a budgetary-neutral tax shift as an exogenous shock, but also supports
the positive effect on regaining competitiveness. In this line, ECB
(2012), Engler et al. (2014) and Stähler and Thomas (2012) use a
two-region monetary union framework to implement an internalthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ﬁscal devaluation in southern European countries increases GDP by
around 1% and improves the trade balance by 0.2% of GDP. Stähler and
Thomas (2012) calibrate their model-setting to Spain and simulate a
number of policy measures including ﬁscal devaluation. They ﬁnd that
a permanent increase in VAT can improve Spain's competitiveness sig-
niﬁcantly. Another study by Gomes et al. (2016) uses a global model
to assess the effects of a temporary ﬁscal devaluation for Spain and
Portugal using a temporary tax shift over a four-year horizon equal to
1% of ex ante nominal GDP. They ﬁnd a trade balance improvement by
0.5% of GDP for both countries. In contrast to these studies, this paper
does not evaluate ﬁscal devaluation as an exogenous tax shift, but im-
plements it as an endogenous ﬁscal intervention in response to trade
balance ﬂuctuations caused by exogenous disturbances.
Farhi et al. (2014) analyse under which conditions a ﬁscal devalua-
tion, understood as a revenue-neutral VAT increase and a reduction in
payroll taxes, can exactly replicate nominal exchange rate devaluation.
Langot et al. (2012) provide an optimal tax scheme by contrasting two
welfare dimensions, namely a welfare-improving reduction of labour
market distortions and awelfare-reducing decline of agents' purchasing
power. This paper does not aim at deriving optimal tax schemes in order
to improve household welfare, it rather implements instrument rules
that adjust taxes in response to trade balance deﬁcits to support real ex-
change rate adjustment in case of competitiveness losses.
Burgert and Roeger (2014) use the European Commission's QUEST3
model to provide a detailed analysis of the distributional effects of a
ﬁscal devaluation on income from ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial wealth,
labour, and social transfers. This paper also examines distributive effects
by implementing two types of households: the ‘richer’ Ricardian (NLC)
households who have access to ﬁnancial markets to smooth their
consumption and the ‘poorer’ liquidity-constrained (LC) households
who have no access to ﬁnancial markets. The introduction of such
ﬁnancial friction allows for comparing the associated welfare effects
across different household types, whereby this paper does not ex-
plicitly address re-distributional effects between household types
or potential compensations. The subsequent welfare implications
are according to Hohberger et al. (2014) who provide utility-based
welfare effects for sectoral reallocation of government expenditures
between tradable and non-tradable goods.
Regarding the existing literature, this paper contributes in twomain
dimensions by (i) modelling ﬁscal devaluation as an instrument rule
that adjusts taxes in response to trade balance ﬂuctuations caused by
a negative economy-wide productivity shock (loss of competitiveness)
and (ii) focussing on the associated welfare effects in the context of a
utility-based assessment of household welfare. To our knowledge, this
paper is the ﬁrst to assess the potential welfare implications of an inter-
nal devaluation based on a simple ﬁscal instrument rule. The welfare
study also provides several sensitivity checks for changes in the model
structure. Additionally, we contribute by using a scenario of monetary
policy independence with ﬂexible nominal exchange rates as bench-
mark in order to gain some intuition whether external devaluation
might dampen external ﬂuctuations.
The analytical framework is a small open economy DSGE model ac-
cording to Galí and Monacelli (2008). The focus on a small member
country of monetary union excludes feedback effects from domestic
events tomonetary policy and the rest ofmonetary union. This is partic-
ularly relevant for analysing policy tools in open economies, which tend
to bemore exposed to asymmetric shocks. Due to our small open econ-
omy assumption, this paper excludes from potential spillover effects as
in ECB (2012) and Lipinska and von Thadden (2012).
This simulation study ﬁnds that ﬁscal devaluation, understood as
a tax shift from employers' SSC to consumption tax, can help
stabilising ﬂuctuations in the trade balance by supporting real ex-
change rate adjustment and regaining price competitiveness. From
a welfare perspective, internal devaluation tends to induce welfare
losses for the average household due to a worsening of the termsof trade. The welfare losses are higher, (i) the higher the tax shift,
(ii) the more open the economy and (iii) the larger the tradable sec-
tor. LC households, who have no access to ﬁnancial markets, suffer
more from ﬁscal devaluation compared to NLC households. Howev-
er, under speciﬁc shocks and country-speciﬁc structures ﬁscal de-
valuation can also be welfare enhancing for NLC households. The
benchmark scenario with ﬂexible nominal exchange rates and au-
tonomous monetary policy performs better in terms of household
welfare, but implies larger external ﬂuctuations in the short run.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the analyt-
ical framework and parameterisation of a small open economy
model within monetary union. Section 3 presents simulations of a
budgetary-neutral tax shift in response to an economy-wide loss
of competitiveness. Section 4 provides associated welfare effects of
ﬁscal devaluation as well as several sensitivity analyses in the con-
text of a utility-based assessment of household welfare. Section 5
concludes.
2. Model
The small open economymodel is based on Hohberger et al. (2014)
and consists of two sectors (tradable and non-tradable), two input
factors, and includes additional frictions (wage stickiness, ﬁnancial
frictions, and capital adjustment costs). Fig. 1 summarises the model
structure.
We augment this model by adding social contribution costs for em-
ployers and employees, lump-sum taxes, and instrument rules to analyse
the impact of ﬁscal devaluation on domestic activity and household
welfare. The model features monopolistic competition in goods and la-
bour markets, nominal price and wage stickiness, liquidity constraints,
as well as capital and labour as production factors. Households are either
intertemporal optimising consumers (NLC) that can freely borrow and
save to smooth consumption over time or liquidity-constrained (LC)
households without access to ﬁnancial markets, consuming their entire
current disposable wage in each period.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), this model uses a debt-
dependent country risk premium on foreign asset holdings as external
closure. It allows for introducing risk-premium shocks that directly
affect nominal interest rate differentials and serves as a way to mimic
demand booms by lowering borrowing costs. Goodsmarkets are imper-
fectly integrated across borders in the sense that there is home bias in
the demand for goods. Labour is immobile between countries. The for-
eign economy (rest of monetary union) variables and monetary policy
are exogenously given from the perspective of the small economy. In
our benchmark scenario, we depart from this assumption and consider
the case of a small open economy outside monetary union, i.e. with
monetary policy independence (Taylor-type monetary policy rule)
and nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility. For the sake of brevity, this sec-
tion only displays themain equations of themodel setting. The detailed
description of the model structure can be found in Hohberger et al.
(2014).
2.1. Households
Welfare of household i is given by the discounted sum of the period
utilities with the discount factor β:
W ¼ E0
X∞
t¼0
βt
1
1−σ
Cit
 1−σ
−
κ
1þ φ L
i
t
 1þφ 
: ð1Þ
Household utility is additive in consumption Cti andwork Lti. As utility
has a constant risk aversion σ, the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion is given by 1/σ, κ speciﬁes the weight on the disutility of work,
and 1/φ stands for the elasticity of labour supply.
Domestic Economy
Government
Levies taxes ( ), pays benefits 
and transfers ( ), and consumption ( )
Firms
Monopolistic competition
Firms combine and 
to produce (tradable 
goods, non-tradable goods)
Households
Ricardian (NLC), Liquidity-constrained 
(LC); both supply labour ( )
Ricardians: can freely borrow and save to 
smooth consumption over time
LC: consume their entire current 
disposable wage and transfer income in 
each period
Goods market
Rest of Monetary Union
Fig. 1.Model structure.
1 Note that Eq. (4) does include an exchange rate term ΔEt+1i /Eti when we consider the
non-monetary union case with monetary policy independence.
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the intertemporal budget constraint is:
1−τwt −τ
SCee
t
 
WitL
i
t þ 1þ it−1ð ÞBt−1
þ 1þ it−1−ω
BH;t−1
4PYt−1Yt−1
þ εrt
 !
Bt−1 þ TRt þ 1−τkt
 
ikt K
i
t−1
þτkt δPCt Kit−1 þ PRt ¼ 1þ τct
 
PCt C
NLC
t þ PCt Iit þ Bt þ BH;t
þγw=2 πw;it
 2
PCt Lt þ TAXt :
ð2Þ
The revenue side includes the labour tax and social contribution
costs adjusted net nominal wage income (1−τtw−τtSCee)WtiLti, the
payment on maturing one-period domestic government bonds Bt−1
including interest it−1, the repayment of one-period net foreign assets
BH ,t−1⁎ including interest, which is the sum of the foreign rate it−1⁎, the
endogenous part of the risk premium−ωBH ,t−1⁎/(4Pt−1Y Yt−1) and the
exogenous component εtr, lump-sum transfers from the government
TRt, the return to capital (1−τtk)itkKt−1i +τtkδPtCKt−1i net of capital taxes
τtk and depreciation allowances τtkδ, and proﬁt income PRt from ﬁrm
ownership. The expenditure side combines nominal consumption PtCCt-
NLC taxed at rate τtc, where PtC is the consumer price index (CPI), nominal
investment in the tradable and non-tradable sector PtCIti, ﬁnancial in-
vestment in domestic bonds and (net) foreign assets, quadratic costs
γw of wage adjustment (πtw ,i≡Wti/Wt−1i −1) and lump-sum tax TAXt as
a non-distortionary tax.The Euler equation for the optimal path of NLC consumption is
given by:
βEt
1þ τct
1þ τctþ1
PCt
PCtþ1
CNLCt
CNLCtþ1
 !σ !
¼ 1
1þ it : ð3Þ
The combination of the FOC for domestic bonds and foreign assets
gives an interest parity condition including the risk premium:
it ¼ it−ω
BH;t−1
4PYt−1Yt−1
þ εrt ð4Þ
with ωN0 and εtr as an exogenous AR(1) risk-premium shock.1
The period budget constraint of LC households, constituting the
share slc of the population, is:
1−τwt −τ
SCee
t
 
WitL
i
t þ TRLCt ¼ 1þ τct
 
PCt C
LC
t þ γw=2 πw;it
 2
PCt L
LC
t : ð5Þ
The per-capita level of aggregate consumption is the weighted
average of NLC and LC consumption:
Ct ≡ 1−slcð ÞCNLCt þ slcCLCt : ð6Þ
Private demand combines domestically produced tradable
(CTH , ti , ITH , ti ), non-tradable (CNT , ti , INT , ti ) and imported (CTF , ti , ITF , ti )
goods. Assuming the same trade price elasticity for consumption
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ﬁne Zt as a CES aggregate of tradable (ZT , ti ) and non-tradable goods
(ZNT , ti ):
Zt ¼ ϕð Þ
1
ψ ZT ;t
 ψ−1
ψ þ 1−ϕð Þ1ψ ZNT;t
 ψ−1
ψ
 	 ψ
ψ−1
ð7Þ
where ϕ and ψ is the share of tradable goods and the elasticity of
substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively.
ZT , t is a composite index of domestically produced tradable goods
(ZTH , t) and imported goods (ZTF , t) deﬁned by:
ZT ;t ¼ hð Þ
1
η ZTH;t
 η−1
η þ 1−hð Þ1η ZTF;t
 η−1
η
 	 η
η−1
ð8Þ
where h represents the steady state home bias and η indicates the
elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods
and imports.
The domestic consumer price index (PtC) is given by:
PCt ¼ ϕð Þ PT;t
 1−ψ þ 1−ϕð Þ PNT;t 1−ψh i 11−ψ ð9Þ
where the domestic country price index for tradable goods (PT ,t) has the
following form:
PT ;t ¼ hð Þ PTH;t
 1−η þ 1−hð Þ PTF;t 1−ηh i 11−η : ð10Þ
Households supply labour services to both tradable and non-
tradable goods sectors. The labour services are distributed equally
across NLC and LC households, and specialised labour unions represent
the different types of labour services i in thewage setting. Thewage set-
ting is subject to quadratic adjustment costs,which provide an incentive
to smooth the wage adjustment and lead to nominal wage stickiness.
Since we assume identical wagesWti for both sectors, the optimisation
problem of the labour union representing the labour service i is:
E0
X∞
t¼0β
t −
κ
1þ φ L
i
t
 1þφ
þ λit 1−τwt −τSCeet
 Wit
PCt
Lit−λ
i
t
γw
2
πw;it
 2 PTH;t
PCt
Lt
 !
:
ð11Þ
The optimisation problem is symmetric across unions i, which
implies identical wages
(Wti=Wt) and labour demand (Lti=Lt) across households. Hence,
the aggregate wage setting equation is:
1−τwt −τ
SCee
t
 Wt
PCt
¼ θ
θ−1
κLφt
λtott
−
γw
θ−1
Wt
Wt−1
PTH;t
PCt
πwt
þ γw
θ−1
βEt
λtottþ1
λtott
Wtþ1
Wt
PTH;tþ1
PCtþ1
Ltþ1
Lt
πwtþ1
 ! ð12Þ
where the gross wage claims increase with increasing labour taxation
(τtw) and employees' social contribution costs (τtSCee) for given levels of
employment.
2.2. Firms
The economy consists of a continuum of monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms in the tradable and non-tradable sector, which are
owned by NLC households and produce a differentiated good Ys ,j
with capital Ks , t−1j , labour Ls , tj and Cobb–Douglas production tech-
nology in each sector s:
Y js;t ¼ As;t K js;t−1
 α
Ljs;t
 1−α
: ð13ÞThe sector-speciﬁc total factor productivity As , t is identical across
ﬁrms and follows an AR(1) process. The cost-minimal combination of
capital and labour is given by:
L js;t
K js;t−1
¼ 1−α
α
ikt
1þ τSCert
 
Wt
ð14Þ
which implies for the nominal marginal costsMCs ,tj of the optimising
ﬁrm:
MC js;t ¼
ikt
 α
1þ τSCert
 
Wt

 1−α
As;tαα 1−αð Þ1−α
: ð15Þ
The employers' SSC is given by τtSCer. The higher the employers' SSC
as percentage of gross wage earnings, the lower the use of labour in
the production of good Ys ,tj .
The ﬁrms in each sector s face quadratic price adjustment costs γp
and set prices Ps , tj to maximise the discounted expected proﬁt. For
each sector, ﬁrms proﬁt maximisation has the following form:
E0
X∞
t¼0β
t λ
NLC
t
λNLC0
P js;t
Ps;t
Y js;t−
1þ τSCert
 
W js;t
Ps;t
L js;t−
γp
2
πp; js:t
 2
Ys;t
 !
: ð16Þ
The nominal GDP is the sum of domestically produced tradable and
non-tradable output:
PYt Yt ¼ PTH;tYT ;t þ PNT ;tYNT;t : ð17Þ
2.3. Government sector
The government collects labour, capital, consumption and lump-sum
taxes – levied only on NLC households – as well as SSC for employers
and employees and issues one-period bonds to ﬁnance government pur-
chases, transfers and the servicing of outstanding debt:
τwt þ τSCeet þ τSCert
 
WtLt þ τkt ikt−δ
 
Kt−1 þ τct PCt Ct þ 1−slcð ÞTAXt þ Bt ¼
PGt Gt þ TRt þ 1þ it−1ð ÞBt−1 :
ð18Þ
Expenditure on total government purchases is the sum of expen-
diture on tradable and non-tradable goods analogously to private
demand:
PGt Gt ¼ PTt GT ;t þ PNTt GNT;t : ð19Þ
Steady state government consumption is given by:
Gt
Yt
¼ ρG
Gt−1
Yt−1
Yt−1
Yt
þ 1−ρGð Þ
G
Y
 !
: ð20Þ
Government adjusts lump-sum taxes to stabilise government debt
and the budget deﬁcit at their target levels according to:
TAXt
PYt Yt
¼ TAXt−1
PYt−1Yt−1
þ ξb
Bt−1
4PYt−1Yt−1
−btar
 !
þ ξdΔ
Bt−1
4PYt−1Yt−1
ð21Þ
where btar is the target debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, the government
increases lump-sum taxes to collect additional revenues if debt and/or
deﬁcit levels exceed the target values. Lump-sum taxes reduce the com-
plexity of the model dynamics, as it does not affect labour supply deci-
sions of workers and the disposable period income and consumption
demand of LC households.
Table 1
Parameter and steady state ratios of the model.
Parameters Symbol Value
Discount factor β 0.995
*Consumption relative to GDP C/Y 0.6
*Government spending relative to GDP G/Y 0.2
*Investment relative to GDP I/Y 0.2
Tradable goods share of GDP T/Y 0.6
*General transfers relative to GDP TR/Y 0.12
Share of LC households slc 0.4
Weight of labour disutility κ 1.0
Elasticity of labour supply 1/φ 0.25
Share of tradable goods in consumption ϕ 0.6
Elasticity of substitution T/NT goods ψ 0.5
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ 0.5
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods η 1.5
Elasticity of substitution between goods varieties j ε 6
Elasticity of substitution for labour services i θ 6
Cobb–Douglas parameter (capital share) a 0.4
Country risk premium ω 0.0025
*Degree of home bias h 0.51
Wage adjustment costs γw 80
Price adjustment costs γp 48
Capital adjustment costs γc 30
*Debt-to-GDP ratio btar 0.74
Fiscal reaction to debt ξb 0.001
Fiscal reaction to deﬁcit ξd 1.0
Persistence of ﬁscal instrument ρG 0.5
Persistence of monetary instrument ρi 0.5
Monetary coefﬁcient on inﬂation ξi 1.5
*Consumption tax rate τc 0.197
*Labour income tax rate τw 0.16
*Social security contribution of employers τSCer 0.25
*Social security contribution of employees τSCee 0.13
*Capital tax rate τk 0.30
*Persistence of TFP shock ρa 0.92
*Standard deviation TFP σa 0.025
*Persistence of risk premium shock ρr 0.85
*Standard deviation risk premium σr 0.015
Note: The asterisked parameters and steady state ratios are based on national accounts
data.
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bank sets interest rates according to the following Taylor-typemonetary
policy rule:
it ¼ ρiit−1 þ 1−ρið Þ 1−βð Þ=β þ 1−ρið Þξπ
PCt
PCt−1
 !
: ð22Þ
2.4. External account
The total demand for domestic output is the sum of ﬁnal domestic
demand, net exports and the wage/price adjustment costs ADCt:
PYt Yt ¼ PCt Ct þ Itð Þ þ PGt Gt þ PTHt Xt−PTF;tMt þ ADCt : ð23Þ
Exports Xt correspond to the import demand of the rest of monetary
union:
Xt ¼ 1−hð Þ PTH;t=PTH;t
 −η
Yt ð24Þ
where h is the degree of home bias. We exclude price discrimination
between countries, i.e. the law of one price holds.
The aggregate resource constraint of the domestic economy, which
is also the law of motion for the net foreign asset (NFA) position, is
given by:
BH;t ¼ 1þ it−1ð ÞBH;t−1 þ PYt Yt−PCt Ct þ Itð Þ−PGt Gt−PYt ADCt ð25Þ
The current account equals the change in net foreign assets:
CAt ¼ BH;t−BH;t−1 : ð26Þ
We treat the rest of the monetary union (foreign economy) as a
single, large country, which engages in trade with the small country.
However, the trade volume with the small country is low such that
the foreign economy is seen as a closed one.
2.5. Parameterisation
Following standard practice, we calibrate the real ratios of the model,
such as consumption and investment shares, trade openness, and govern-
ment size on the basis of national accounts data. As themodel is supposed
to reﬂect an average small open economy in monetary union, the res-
pective group of countries comprises Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece,
Ireland, theNetherlands, Portugal and Spain. The national data are obtain-
ed from the Eurostat database of the European Commission and theOECD
database. The numerical values of the model parameters are obtained
from empirical studies in the literature of DSGE models. The parameter
values, steady state ratios and exogenous variables are summarised in
Table 1.2
The steady-state ratios are calibrated to replicate the average share
of private consumption (60%), investment (20%) and government pur-
chases (20%) in euro area GDP during 1999Q1–2012Q4. The parameter
h = 0.51 matches the average import-to-GDP ratio of the eight small
euro area countries. We set the share of tradable goods in total con-
sumption to ϕ = 0.6 in order to get a steady-state ratio of tradable
goods to GDP of 60% (Lombardo and Ravenna, 2012). In the observed
timeperiod, the average government debt-to-GPD ratio is 74%. The bud-
get closure implies that a 1 percentage point increase in government
debt-to-GDP (deﬁcit-to-GDP) ratio increases taxes or decreases trans-
fers by 0.001 (1.0) percentage points.2 For the sake of brevity, this section focuses predominantly on describing general
steady state shares and relevant parameter values to focus on the main objective of ﬁscal
devaluation. Parameter values in Table 1 that are not explicitly mentioned in this section
are obtained from Hohberger et al. (2014).The tax rate on consumption of 19.7% is given by the average VAT
rate within the euro area for the period 1999–2012 (European Union,
2013). The average tax rate on capital income is 30% (OECD Tax Data-
base). Given the total gross earnings, households pay labour income
tax and SSC as a percentage share of their gross wage earnings. The
average labour income tax burden for the given period is 16% of total
earnings plus 13% SSC for the households. Thus, the net income of
households amounts to 71% of total gross wage earnings. Firms contrib-
ute on average 25% SSC as a percentage of total gross wage earnings to
the general government. Consequently, the total labour costs of ﬁrms
amount to 125% of gross wage earnings.
Following Rabanal (2009) and Gomes et al. (2016), the elasticity of
substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods is set to ψ =
0.5. The trade elasticity between domestic and foreign tradable goods
is η = 1.5 and corresponds to the euro area estimates by Imbs and
Méjean (2010). According to Druant et al. (2012), we choose the wage
and price adjustment cost parameters to match the average duration
of wage and price adjustments of ﬁve and four quarters, respectively.
The estimates for the share of liquidity-constrained (LC) households in
the euro area clusters around 40% in the literature and is set to slc =
0.4 (e.g. Ratto et al., 2009).
Table 2 compares moments of the benchmark model under the
combination of a supply and demand shock and the absence of ﬁscal
devaluation to actual data for the group of eight smaller Europeanmem-
ber countries for the period 1999Q1–2012Q4. It shows that the model
matches important characteristics fairly well. More precisely, the model
replicates the correlation of consumption, employment and the trade bal-
ance with output. The high correlation of government purchases with
output is caused by the calibration of government purchases as a ﬁxed
Table 2
Comparing model and data moments.
Variable Baseline calibration Actual data
Correlation with output Standard deviation Correlation with output Standard deviation
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
Output 1.00 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.02 0.04 0.01
Consumption 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.80 0.88 1.21 0.47
Government 0.93 0.85 0.15 0.61 −0.46 1.28 2.43 0.38
Investment 0.87 1.82 0.82 0.93 0.64 3.64 5.83 1.67
Employment 0.22 1.34 0.64 0.93 0.38 0.76 1.06 0.57
Trade balance −0.33 0.31 −0.27 0.15 −0.75 1.56 2.25 0.81
Inﬂation 0.13 0.42 0.46 0.82 −0.28 0.64 0.92 0.43
Note: All moments are based on quarterly data. The variables are in logarithms and hp-ﬁltered with λ= 1600 for quarterly data (except trade balance, which is relative to GDP, and
inﬂation,which is the year-on-year percentage change of the Consumer Price Index). The actual datamean is calculated for the group of eight smaller EA-countries for 1999Q1–2012Q4, namely
AUT, BEL, ESP, FIN, GRC, IRL, NLD andPRT.Maximumandminimumvalues are given by the lowest and highest ranked country for the particularmeasure. The standard deviation is the standard
deviation relative to the standard deviation of output, which is the absolute standard deviation.
517S. Hohberger, L. Kraus / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 512–522share of GDP in the baseline calibration. Of particular note is the high vol-
atility of investment, which is in line with the data patterns. The model-
generated volatility of employment is slightly higher compared to actual
data. The trade balance is negatively correlated with output and matches
the data pattern, whereas the volatility of the trade balance is relatively
low. The low volatility of inﬂation compared to data moments is related
to the assumption of constant import prices.
3. Simulation
Fiscal devaluation is simulated as a revenue-neutral tax shift from
employers' SSC towards consumption tax in response to ﬂuctuations
in the trade balance (TB/Y):
τ ct ¼ ρGτ ct−1 þ 1−ρGð Þτc þ 1−ρGð ÞξFD
TBt
Yt
 
ð27Þ
τ SCert ¼ ρGτSCert−1 þ 1−ρGð Þτ SCer− τct−τct
  PCt Ct
WtLt
 !
: ð28Þ
The mechanism behind these ﬁscal instrument rules are the
following: In case of a trade balance deﬁcit, a negative parameter
value (ξFDb 0) implies an increase in consumption tax. The addi-
tional consumption tax revenues are then accompanied by lowering
the employers' SSC in order to keep the overall level of government
revenues ex ante constant.3 This tax shift ensures budget-neutrality
and mimics simultaneously the real effects of nominal exchange rate
depreciation. The parameter value ξFD=−5 is calibrated such that a
0.5 percentage point decline in the trade balance leads to a 1 per-
centage point increase in the consumption tax with a corresponding
SSC reduction to ensure ex ante budget-neutrality.4
In order to analyse the impact of ﬁscal devaluation on the domestic
economywe present simulations for a negative economy-wide produc-
tivity (TFP) shock under different model and policy settings: First, we
show impulse response functions (IRF) for the domestic economy that
occur due to the competitiveness loss in the absence of supportive pol-
icies (no-policy case, NP). Second, we examine the potential of ﬁscal de-
valuation (FD) as a tax shift from employers' SSC towards consumption
to accelerate real exchange rate adjustment and support trade balance
stabilisation. Third, we display IRFs for the case that the domestic econ-
omy is not amember of the euro area as a benchmark.We use this third3 Hohberger et al. (2014) simulates internal devaluation as a tax shift from labour in-
come to consumption tax. In contrast to their approach, we follow the majority of the
existing literature to affect directly the ﬁrms pricing process and avoid potential second
round effects that might counteract the positive effect of supporting the supply side.
4 Given the underlying TFP shock size and associated trade balance deﬁcit, the implied
tax shift of this parameter value is quantitatively comparable to those used by Engler et al.
(2014) and Gomes et al. (2016).scenario to address the question whether the domestic economy per-
forms better in terms of household welfare in the presence of ﬂexible
nominal exchange rates, i.e. non-EMU membership, compared to the
monetary union scenario.5
3.1. Negative economy-wide productivity shock (“loss of competitiveness”)
Fig. 2 shows impulse responses for a negative economy-wide TFP
shock, simulated as a temporary 2.5 percentage point decline of the
total factor productivity relative to the rest of monetary union. In the
no-policy scenario (NP), output and private consumption decline due
to an increase in domestic goods prices, resulting in an appreciation (in-
crease) of the real exchange rate and a corresponding trade balance def-
icit. Price andwage stickiness delays the increase in domestic prices and
lowers real interest rates, so that consumption and output declinemore
moderately on impact. The increase in employment by 2.5% is associat-
ed with a lower productivity level when prices and wages are sticky.
Fiscal devaluation (FD) implies a tax shift from employers' SSC rate
towards consumption tax (see Eqs. (27) and (28)). More precisely, a ﬁs-
cal parameter value of ξFD=−5 in Fig. 2 implies an increase in con-
sumption tax of around 1.5 percentage points and a corresponding
reduction of employers' SSC rate of around 3.5 percentage points to
keep the government tax revenues ex ante constant. As a consequence,
ﬁscal devaluation dampens the real exchange rate appreciation and re-
duces the trade balance deﬁcit substantially.
By shifting the tax burden from labour to consumption, producer
(export) prices decline and import prices increase, as the increase
in consumption tax only affects imported goods while exempting
exported goods from domestic ﬁrms. The increase in consumption tax
and corresponding reduction of labour costs in the production process
dampens the real exchange rate appreciation and the decline in net ex-
ports. As a result, the trade balance improves substantially compared to
the NP scenario. Our tax shift underlines the ﬁnding by Langot et al.
(2012) that the increase in consumption taxes has to be accompanied
by larger decreases in employers' SSC in order to ensure budget-
neutrality. The effects of ﬁscal devaluation on domestic variables, e.g.
output, consumption and employment are ambiguous: While con-
sumption decreases due to higher consumption taxes, ﬁscal devaluation
reduces the output decline and increases employment.
In the presence of autonomous monetary policy (Eq. (22)) and ﬂex-
ible exchange rates, i.e. the non-EMU case (FLEX), the simulation results
show that in case of a negative economy-wide TFP shock, ﬂuctuations of
macroeconomic variables are even more pronounced compared to the
monetary union scenario. This is due to the fact that the upward pres-
sure on domestic prices leads to monetary policy tightening, i.e. an in-
terest rate increase, with two accompanying effects on the economy:5 The simulations and welfare computations are performed using the DYNARE toolbox
for MATLAB (Adjemian et al., 2011).
Note: Impulse responses are specified in percent, except those for the trade balance and the tax rates, which 
are given in percent relative to GDP and percentage points, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Fiscal devaluation in response to a negative TFP shock. Note: Impulse responses are speciﬁed in percent, except those for the trade balance and the tax rates, which are given in
percent relative to GDP and percentage points, respectively.
6 The quantitative results refer to the overall welfare effects, i.e. the combination of
mean and variance effects.
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tion of lower consumer prices lead to higher real interest rates and a de-
crease in consumption and investment. Second, the increase in interest
rates appreciates the nominal exchange rate on impact. The subsequent
increase in the real exchange rate worsens the trade balance. However,
the expected nominal exchange rate depreciation in the future acceler-
ates the adjustment process in the medium run.
Hence, the simulations for a loss in competitiveness suggest that
(i) internal devaluation (FD) supports the supply side by reducing pro-
ducer prices, accelerates real exchange rate adjustment and improves
the trade balance; (ii) monetary devaluation (FLEX) leads to stronger
real effects with higher output, consumption, and trade balance volatil-
ity on impact due to monetary policy tightening. In order to make con-
clusive statements about the effects of ﬁscal devaluation on household
welfare, we provide a welfare analysis in the following section.
4. Welfare
As welfare implications have been mainly neglected so far in the
literature on ﬁscal devaluation, we examine the welfare effects in the
context of a utility-based assessment of household welfare. Following
Lucas (2003) and Canzoneri et al. (2007), we use a second-order Taylor
expansion of the household utility function (Eq. (1)) around a deter-
ministic steady state. We measure the cost of policy intervention with
a second-order approximation of a value function for aggregate welfare
W(ξFD) for NLC and LC households, where we deﬁne CC(ξFD=0) as a
cardinal number of the cost of nominal rigiditieswithout ﬁscal interven-
tion (ξFD=0) in percentages of consumption:
CC ξFD ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ W ξFD≠0ð Þ−W ξFD ¼ 0ð Þ ð29ÞThe second-order Taylor approximation of the discounted period
utilities in terms of log-deviation yields:
W ξFDð Þ≈
X∞
t¼0
βt
ci
 1−σ
1−σ
−
κ l
1þφ
1þ φþ c
i
 −σ
Ec^it−κ l
φ
E^lt
−
σ ci
 −1−σ
2
Var c^it
 
−
κφl
−1þφ
2
Var l^t
 
2
666664
3
777775 ð30Þ
where c and l denote the steady-state level and c^ and l^ the period log-
deviation from the steady state.6 Following Canzoneri et al. (2007),
the cost of ﬁscal devaluation CC(ξFD≠0) measured in percent of
steady-state consumption and expressed in negative values is given
by 100∗[1−(1−β)∗CC(ξFD=0)] and leads to:
CC ξFD≠0ð Þ ¼ 100  1− 1−βð Þf W ξFD ≠0ð Þ−W ξFD ¼ 0ð Þ½ g ð31Þ
Following Hohberger et al. (2014) and Vogel et al. (2013), we show
welfare gains (positive values) and welfare losses (negative values) for
a range of policy parameter values ξFD to provide information on the
robustness of welfare effects. Therefore, we run simulations over the in-
terval [−10; 2] for theﬁscal policy parameter ξFD in steps of 0.2.Welfare
gains and losses aremeasured relative to non-stabilisation (ξFD=0) and
are expressed in percent of steady state consumption for NLC house-
holds, LC households and the weighted average of both household
types (TOTAL). The welfare effects are simulated for a negative produc-
tivity shock as in Section 3 and are shown in Fig. 3.
Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
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Fig. 3.Welfare effects of ﬁscal devaluation. Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
519S. Hohberger, L. Kraus / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 512–522Given aﬁscal parameter value of ξFD=−5 (as used in Section 3) and
lump-sum taxes as budget closure, ﬁscal devaluation implies moderate
welfare losses of around 0.03% of steady state consumption for average
households. Given the identical utility functions for both types of house-
holds, the welfare losses for LC households are considerably higher
compared to NLC households, as they are not able to smooth their
consumption over time. Therefore, LC households suffer (beneﬁt)
more than NLC households from policy interventions that imply higher
(lower) temporary income ﬂuctuations, which is line with ﬁndings by
Vogel et al. (2013) and Burgert and Roeger (2014). Hence, shifting the
tax burden towards consumption generateswelfare losses for LC house-
holds of 0.09% of steady state consumption (ξFD=−5) due to the
reduction of LC households' purchasing power of their disposable in-
come. In contrast, NLC households experience small welfare gains, par-
ticularly for the policy parameters range [−7; 0]. For the ﬁscal policy
parameter value of (ξFD=−5) welfare gains are relative stable with
0.01%. Increasing prices (due to the TFP shock) and higher consumption
taxes encourage NLC households to decrease private consumption and
increase savings in order to maximise their welfare. This leads to higher
net foreign assets compared to the no-policy scenario (NP) and, thus, to
a decline in the trade balance deﬁcit.
The ﬁrst implication of the welfare analysis suggests that the stronger
the tax shift from labour to consumption the higher thewelfare losses for
NLC and LC households. To a given extent, however, ﬁscal devaluation
might be a policy tool to regain price competitiveness even with subse-
quent welfare enhancing effects.
4.1. Changes in the model structure
In order to gain insights in the robustness of thewelfare implications
we provide several analyses for changes in the model structure, i.e. in a
macro- and microeconomic perspective. We examine (i) the welfare
effects for economieswith alternative relative sector sizes (T/NT) and dif-
ferent degrees of openness, (ii) the welfare implications for changes in
different elasticity parameters that directly inﬂuence the utility function
of households, and (iii) the welfare effects in case of a demand shock.
4.1.1. Relative T/NT-size and openness
The relative size of the two sectors (T/NT) should affect the
stabilising potential of ﬁscal devaluation on the trade balance as well
as householdwelfare. Panels a) and b) in Fig. 4 depict thewelfare effects
for tradable goods shares of ϕ=0.1 and ϕ=0.9 (instead of ϕ=0.6 in
the baseline calibration). From a stabilisation perspective, a tax shift
away from labour decreases domestic produced goods prices, which re-
duces the prices for tradable goods as a composite of domestic and for-
eign produced tradables (see Eq. (9)). As a consequence, the relatively
low price for domestic tradables compared to foreign goods increasesnet exports by increasing foreign demand and, hence, improves the
trade balance. From a welfare perspective, however, households should
beneﬁt more from a ﬁscal devaluation in case of a relatively large non-
tradable sector due to lower domestic average prices.
These hypotheses are supported by panels a) and b) in Fig. 4. Addi-
tionally, it implies a trade-off: The higher the relative size of the tradable
goods sector, the higher the potential of trade balance stabilisation on
the one hand, but the higher the welfare losses for average household
on the other hand.
Similar considerations arise from changes in the home bias (h=0.1
and h=0.9 instead of h=0.51 in the baseline calibration), which are
depicted in panels c) and d) in Fig. 4. The lower the home bias (i.e. the
more open the economy), the higher the potential of rebalancing, but
the higher the welfare losses for the average household. Therefore, in
scenarios of a low tradable goods share (a) or a high degree of home
bias (d) average households can achieve moderate welfare gains.
4.1.2. Alternative microeconomic elasticities
Studies by Imbs and Méjean (2010) and Simonovska and Waugh
(2014) highlight that divergent trade elasticities play an important
role in understanding the transmission mechanism between interna-
tional prices and real variables.We use alternative values for the elastic-
ity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (η= 1.5 in our
benchmark calibration) to show how it inﬂuences the welfare implica-
tions of an internal devaluation. Panels a) and b) in Fig. 5 suggest that
low trade elasticity decreases thewelfare losses for both types of house-
holds. Even more, it seems that NLC households experience small wel-
fare gains, as households are willing to consume more at home with
lower relative prices.
Potential welfare gains for NLC households also arise by higher
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (lower value of σ) in panel c).
Due to higher sensitivity to changes in the real interest rate, NLC house-
holds smooth their consumption more rapidly in response to higher
consumption taxes.
Similar welfare implications arise from a higher labour supply elas-
ticity (lower value ofφ). Panels e) and f) in Fig. 5 suggest that the higher
the elasticity of labour supply, the higher the potentialwelfare gains of a
ﬁscal devaluation. In case of higher labour elasticity, households can
respond to higher real wages by increasing labour supply, which in-
creases income and compensates for higher consumption taxes.
4.2. Demand boom (risk premium shock)
Based on the debate that ﬁscal devaluation could be used as policy
tool to mitigate excessive consumption demand, we address the
question whether welfare effects change in case of demand shocks.
We simulate a negative risk premium shock of 1.5 percentage points
7 The welfare implications are also robust and do not change qualitatively with respect
to variations in the compositions of the two household types. However, thewelfare results
shift more in the direction of the respective household type, which supports the impor-
tance of access to ﬁnancial markets in order to smooth consumption – and enhance wel-
fare – in case of cyclical or ﬁscal disturbances.
8 This trade-off highlights thatﬁscal devaluation is explicitly based on the assumption of
rigid wages (De Mooij and Keen, 2013).
Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
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Fig. 4.Welfare effects for alternative T/NT-size and openness. Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
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induces a decline in domestic interest rates. Individuals face lower bor-
rowing rates, which strengthen domestic consumption and investment
demand and the demand for imports. The increase in domestic demand
puts upward pressure on prices and wages and appreciates the real ex-
change rate. The higher domestic price level relative to the rest of mon-
etary union leads to a loss of price competitiveness and deteriorates
external positions. Similar to the productivity shock, ﬁscal devaluation
implies an increase in consumption tax and a corresponding reduction
of employers' SSC rate. The tax shift mitigates the demand boom, accel-
erates real exchange rate adjustment and improves the trade balance.
From a welfare perspective, Fig. 6 displays that ﬁscal devaluation
implies substantially higher welfare losses for both types of household
in case of a demand shock compared to a supply shock. For a given ﬁscal
parameter value of (ξFD=−5), a tax shift from labour towards
consumption generateswelfare losses of 0.07% (0.7%) of steady state con-
sumption forNLChouseholds (LChouseholds), respectively. In contrast to
the TFP shock, even smallmagnitudes ofﬁscal devaluation denotewelfare
losses.
4.3. Comparison across policies and model settings
In order to summarise and evaluate our results, welfare effects as
well as standard deviations of output and the trade balance over a 10-
year horizon (40 quarters) are shown in Table 3. It provides anoverview
over the performance relative to alternative model settings across dif-
ferent economic disturbances, i.e. supply and demand shocks.
Summarising the previous discussion, the standard deviations in
Table 3 highlight that ﬁscal devaluation is a potential policy tool to accel-
erate real exchange rate adjustment and support external rebalancing,
albeit with different effects on stabilising economic activity, dependingon the nature of the shocks. Froma utility-based assessment of household
welfare, ﬁscal devaluation tends to induce welfare losses, whereby LC
households, who cannot smooth their consumption over time, are sub-
stantially more affected.7 Changes in the model structure suggest that
the higher the relative size of the tradable sector and the more open the
economy, the higher the average welfare losses through ﬁscal devalua-
tion. This is because higher consumption taxes offset the fall in domestic
prices, but increase the prices on import goods. Hence, households suffer
more from higher import prices, the higher the openness and the larger
the tradable goods sector. Sensitivity checks in case of ﬂexible wages
and prices deliver the expected improvements in terms of welfare. In
case ofﬂexiblewages, substantialwelfare gains arise due to an immediate
increase inwage claims in response to higher consumption taxes. Howev-
er, this comes at the expense of destabilising effects on economic activity,
as ﬁrms will only face lower labour costs and decrease domestic prices as
long as ﬁrms are not immediately faced with increasing wage costs.8 In
case of ﬂexible prices, ﬁscal devaluation increases particularly thewelfare
of LC households, as the immediate reduction of lower domestic prices in-
crease real wages and, hence, their disposable income for consumption.
Furthermore, the scenario of a small country outside a monetary
union (FLEX) with nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility and inﬂation-
targetingmonetary policy does not automatically dampen externalﬂuc-
tuations; but lower consumption and employment volatilities induce
Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
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Fig. 5.Welfare effects for alternative sensitivity analyses. Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
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Fig. 6.Welfare effects of ﬁscal devaluation. Note: Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state consumption.
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Table 3
Summary of the welfare effects.
Sensitivity analysis
Model and policy setting NLC Welfare LC waelfare Total welfare
Benchmark model ( FD = –5 ; TFP shock) 0.01% –0.09% –0.03%
Sector size 0.04% 0.02% 0.03%
– 0.01% –0.14% –0.06%
Home bias 0.00% –0.12% –0.05%
0.05% 0.00% 0.03%
Int. El. Subst. 0.04% –0.07% –0.01%
–0.01% –0.06% –0.03%
Labour supply 0.04% –0.04% 0.01%
0.00% –0.09% –0.04%
Flexible prices = 0 –0.02% 0.08% 0.02%
Flexible wages = 0 0.28% 0.11% 0.21%
Demand boom (neg. risk premium) – 0.07% –0.69% –0.32%
Flexible exchange rate adjustment 0.21% 0.04% 0.14%
Standard deviations
Macroeconomic variable No policy (NP)
Fiscal 
devaluation 
(FD)
Flexible EXR 
adjustment 
(FLEX)
TFP shock
Output 0.55 0.47 0.66
Trade balance 0.11 0.05 0.14
Demand shock
Output 0.17 0.20 0.07
Trade balance 0.22 0.14 0.23
Note: Shaded numbers with positive values imply welfare gains.
522 S. Hohberger, L. Kraus / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 512–522welfare gains for both types of households compared to the monetary
union scenario.
5. Conclusion
This paper uses a two-sector DSGE model of a small open econo-
my in monetary union with nominal and real rigidities to analyse
the potential of ﬁscal devaluation, speciﬁed as budgetary-neutral
tax shift from employers' SSC towards consumption tax (VAT), to support
real exchange rate adjustment, regain price competitiveness and help
stabilising external ﬂuctuations. We contribute to the existing literature
by (i) modelling ﬁscal devaluation as an instrument rule that adjusts
taxes in response to trade balance ﬂuctuations and (ii) examining the
welfare implications of ﬁscal devaluation in the context of a standard as-
sessment of household welfare. We compare the welfare effects with an
economy outside monetary union with nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility
and monetary independence.
The simulations suggest that ﬁscal devaluation is a potential
stabilisation tool to facilitate real exchange rate adjustment by supporting
the economies supply side. The subsequent improvement in price com-
petitiveness (terms of trade deterioration) supports external rebalancing
in the presence of economy-wide supply and demand shocks. From a
utility-based welfare perspective, the associated tax shift from labour to-
wards consumption induces welfare losses for the average household.
The overall welfare effects are pro-cyclical in the sense that the stronger
the tax shift, the higher the welfare losses for both types of household.
Thereby, LC households,whohaveno access toﬁnancialmarkets and can-
not smooth their consumption over time, suffer more from ﬁscal devalu-
ation with higher welfare losses compared to NLC households.
Ourwelfare results are robust to changes in themodel structure. De-
pending on the nature of the shock and/or country-speciﬁc structures,
however, ﬁscal devaluation can also imply welfare enhancing effects,
particularly for NLC households in the event of productivity shocks. In
general, welfare losses are higher, the higher the relative size of the
tradable goods sector and the more open the economy. This is becausehigher consumption taxes offset the fall in domestic producer prices,
but prices on imported goods increase.
The alternative scenario with nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility and
monetary independence shows that monetary devaluation does not
automatically dampen external ﬂuctuations. However, lower consump-
tion and employment volatilities induce welfare gains for both types of
household compared to the monetary union scenario.
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